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Westminster, while demands to address aviation's rising carbon emissions have been side-lined by the supposed benefits of international carbon trading mechanisms (this time in the shape of CORSIA, which is the highly contested global carbon offsetting scheme for air travel that will come into full operation in 2027).
Arguably, following the work of the Airports Commission and the Brexit referendum, and at least in some government circles, the issue of aviation policy is now seen through a post-sustainable lens; issues of sustainability and climate change are thus relativized to other equally pressing goals, such as economic growth and enhanced international connectivity. In other words, it inhabits a post-Brexit world in which aviation expansion goes hand in glove with aspirations of a global Britain that can trade in new and emerging markets. At the same time, the future of Heathrow, London's international hub, is once more bound to the fate of the capital city and the rest of the country. In short, although Theresa May was previously a vocal opponent of expansion, the resignation of Cameron, the increasing political salience of new trading roles and connections for the UK in post-Brexit scenarios, and May's own short-term political need for a 'strong' symbolic decision to cement her premiership, all came together to re-legitimise the building of the third runway at Heathrow.
Nonetheless, despite this shifting context, opposition to expansion remains. Local communities oppose noise and air pollution, whilst environmentalists continue to draw attention to rising carbon emissions, climate change, and the limits of global emissions trading. Local authorities in and around London are preparing to come together to oppose expansion. The same is true for local residents and communities, more of whom risk being affected by increasing levels of noise, deteriorating air 3 quality, and greater congestion, not to mention concerns about the destruction of property and adequate compensation.
2 Of course, the government has sought to resolve the problem of noise and rebuild trust in the wake of accusations that successive governments have broken their promises about Heathrow expansion. In particular, it has put forward plans for an Independent Commission on Civil Aviation
Noise (ICCAN), as well as a revamped consultative committee at HeathrowHeathrow Community Engagement Board (HCEB). The latter is expected to be given greater powers and has already been endowed with a more high-profile leader in the person of Rachel Cerfontyne, former deputy chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission. 3 Yet the stark fact remains that a growing list of British governments has been unable to engineer a partial or temporary policy settlement in aviation. Indeed, there has been no new runway in the South East for over 70 years. So the question still remains: will the government get their expansion proposals to stick this time? This introduction offers an initial characterisation of the shifting political and policy contexts of UK aviation. We also set out the thematic concerns and conceptual architecture that are employed in the three papers collected together in this special collection on the Airports Commission and airport expansion and management. We begin with a brief conceptualization of aviation as a 'wicked policy issue'.
AVIATION AS A WICKED POLICY ISSUE
It has become commonplace to characterize contemporary policy controversies as 'wicked policy issues', which are 'immune' to traditional 'cures' or the 'messy solutions' of often contradictory policy instruments. Of course, it is often suggested that all policy issues are in some ways 'intractable' or 'stubborn', all too readily shoved in the 'too difficult box'. 4 After all, the work of politics is mostly devoted to the generation of pragmatic, second-best solutions that might improve the plight of some of the people some of the time. 5 Putting such realities to one side for a moment, we begin by conceptualizing aviation as a wicked policy issue, thus foregrounding the fundamental challenges facing any British government in reaching a temporary settlement in the domain of airport expansion.
In the first place, drawing upon the seminal definition of wicked issues by Rittel and Webber, the cluster of problems posed by flying can neither be readily formulated nor easily agreed upon. 6 In the 1960s, the question of aviation was mainly linked to issues about conservation and the quality of life of those directly affected by its rapid growth, while in the 2000s increasing concerns about its impacts on climate change, social justice and global inequalities were added to the list. One consequence of these developments is that it has become increasingly difficult to constrain aviation policy to its traditional domain of connectivity, economic growth and social progress. At the same time, the underlying assumptions of the 'predict and provide' model, whereby growing passenger numbers were taken as a sign of progress, so that the central task of any government was to provide sufficient capacity for aviation expansion, no longer holds (if it ever did). Forecasting for growth -or starting from the premise of expansion -only gets a partial grip on the slippery problem that is now aviation. In short, as the domain of aviation policy has become more complex, and as its boundaries become more blurred, so too has the capacity of policymakers to tame the 5 unpredictable interdependencies between air travel and other social and political practices.
The upshot of aviation as a wicked policy problem is that it has given birth to rival constructions of the problem, including airport capacity, aviation noise, air pollution, climate change, uneven economic and regional development, airspace management, social mobility, or global connectivity. By their very nature, such issues spill over into rival arenas, exposing complicated and unpredictable patterns of interdependency. For example, tackling aircraft noise will at some point impact upon efforts to reduce carbon emissions levels, while developing new hybrid or electric planes to offset carbon emissions will potentially increase noise as new structures are added to planes to reduce approach speeds. Aviation planning and expansion at Heathrow are also intertwined with the spatial management of economic infrastructure in the South-East of England and the dilemmas of uneven economic development across the UK.
Equally, the practice of regulating aviation has, in the words of Rittel and Webber, 'no stopping rule'. Practices and outcomes of noise management, environmental efficiency, air quality, or airspace navigation can always be improved, while other dimensions of the problems suddenly come to light, so there is never a completely optimal solution and unforeseen consequences abound. 
FRAMING MATTERS: BRACKETING OUT ISSUES
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Set against these economic benefits, the failure of government to act to address capacity constraint would, in the eyes of the Commission, be 'short-sighted and perilous'. 9 The Commission thus repeated the rhetoric of economic risk and overloaded airport capacity, which is inscribed in countless white papers, ministerial statements and policy briefings. Indeed, it invoked the fear of economic decline and reduced mobility, which has hung like the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the British public throughout the post-war regime of aviation expansion. The latter had been predicated on a utilitarian logic of 'predict and provide', paying little attention to the overall pattern of expansion or wider environmental concerns. 10 Empirical evidence suggests that once actors invest in a particular frame, it tends to 'stick', thus serving to constantly re-construct their interactions and dialogues with others. Over time, the function of each policy frame is to bracket out different dimensions of the wicked issue of aviation expansion. Indeed, frames are inherently political, as they exclude particular discourses and arguments, while foregrounding others. In fact, the very existence of a rival frame is one of the conditions for a frame's existence: what organizes and sustains one group of actors' investments in a way of seeing is the opposition of a rival frame.
FRAGMENTED GOVERNANCE AND THE ABSENCE OF GATEKEEPERS
It is not surprising that the ongoing antagonisms and disputes in the field of aviation policy are reflected in their governance, which is increasingly pluralized, 
DEPOLITICISATION: YOU CAN'T GET RID OF POLITICS
Vigorous debate about the concept of depoliticization -that is, endeavours to remove the sting of politics from a particular issue or practice through various means -has emerged in recent discussions of statecraft, governance and policy-making. 11 As we note above, the notion has also been used by actors engaged in the current endeavours to reach an acceptable settlement about UK aviation. Indeed, the government's turn to the Airports commission -an expert committee that would have the time and space to reach a considered conclusion -can be seen as an explicit attempt to remove the issue from the hurly-burly of partisan politics, so that a more technocratic and reason-based solution could be reached. Yet, in dealing with wicked policy issues, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to circumvent the problem and thus reach a rational and acceptable answer. Depoliticization (by definition) presupposes prior and concurrent processes of politicization, and strategies of depoliticization can often re-politicize the issues that are addressed. Logics of depoliticization are thus at best often only temporary solutions to a dilemma or at worst displacements of problems.
Seen in this light, the Airports Commission promised to take the politics out of aviation policy. As it was widely noted in September 2012, when the Commission was established, the Cameron government had decided to delegate to its 'independent' commissioners, led by Sir Howard Davies, the task of delivering a workable and binding evidence-driven settlement, which could guide airports policy for the next 20 or 30 years. Of particular concern in this regard was the desire to tackle the problem of noise. The Commission thus reiterated its support, first voiced in its 2013 interim report, for an independent aviation noise authority to 'act as an impartial source of expertise and advice'. And it supplemented this appeal to use impartial and independent expertise, which could function above and beyond the realm of politics, with a proposal to create a Community Engagement Board. Based on existing arrangements at Frankfurt and Schiphol airports, which had earlier been advocated by the Civil Aviation Authority 12 , this board would act as a 'trusted repository of information'. It is plausible to argue that this proposal was part of a broader strategy to reframe community opposition to aviation noise, not in terms of concrete demands against the impact of noise on quality of life, but as a problem about the lack of trust in public decision-making. Indeed, in seeking to move such issues out of the political domain, the Commission voiced its continued concerns that the existing arrangements for airspace changes left final decisions with the Secretary of State; it thus exposed them to the risk of 'being politicised', which could in turn 'risk delay or, at the extreme, failure'. 
